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"WHY ADAMS NEEDS TO MODIFY HIS DIVINECOMMAND THEORY ONE MORE TIME"*
Stephen J. Sullivan

Robert Merrihew Adams has twice modified the divine-command theory of
morality in interesting and plausible ways. The resulting theory says that
rightness and wrongness consist respectively in agreement and disagreement
with the commands of a loving God, and that a causallhistorical account of
the reference of moral terms is correct. I argue, first, that Adams's theory
must face up to the objection that it depicts morality-implausibly-as arbitrary; second, that the account of reference he accepts does not permit him
to adopt either of two natural strategies for rebutting the objection; and
finally, that this account does allow him recourse to a third, somewhat less
natural strategy which requires modifying the theory one more time.

For the last two decades Robert Merrihew Adams has been one of the ablest
defenders of the divine-command theory of morality, which he has modified
in interesting and plausible ways. In its unqualified forms the theory says that
morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: an action is
obligatory just in case and just because God commands it, wrong just in case
and just because God forbids it, and permissible just in case and just because
He neither commands nor forbids it.l In his 1973 paper "A Modified Divine
Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" Adams proposes a version of the
theory according to which it is part of the meaning of (e.g.) '(ethically)
wrong' in Judeo-Christian discourse that an action is wrong if and only if it
is contrary to God's commands, but only on the assumption that God is
loving. 2 In this way, he emphasizes, the divine-command theory no longer
has the counterintuitive implication that if God were to command cruelty for
its own sake then it would be wrong to disobey Him. 3 In later writings Adams
retains this emphasis on divine love: he identifies rightness with the property
of being in agreement with the commands of a loving God and wrongness
with the property of being contrary to those commands. 4 But he adopts a very
different semantic apparatus-primarily in his 1979 paper "Divine Command
Metaethics Modified Again"-in defending the theory. Influenced by the
work of Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and Keith Donnellan on causal/historical accounts of the reference of proper names and natural kind terms, Adams
maintains (a) that (e.g.) '(ethically) wrong' refers in the language of nonbelievers as well as Judeo-Christian believers to the property of contrariety to
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the commands of a loving God; (b) that it does so not in virtue of the meaning
of the term but because this property best fills the partly causal role specified
by our concept of wrongness; and (c) that it is metaphysically rather than
analytically necessary that an action is wrong if and only if it contravenes
the commands of a loving God. s
I think Adams's second modification of the divine-command theory significantly improves it in certain respects. For one thing, the theory avoids the
implausible implication that when believers and nonbelievers seem to be in
moral disagreement they are actually talking past one another. 6 For another,
there are both related and independent reasons for thinking that a causal/historical account of the reference of moral terms is indeed correct. 7 But I shall
argue that these improvements come at a certain price: they leave Adams's
twice-modified divine-command theory exposed to the venerable objection
that morality is arbitrary if it depends on God's will.
Section I explains this arbitrariness objection and its relevance to Adams's
theory. Section II considers two natural ways for him to answer the objection
and argues that the causallhistorical account of reference he accepts will not
allow him these means of escape. Finally, Section III suggests a somewhat less
natural way out which would require him to modify his theory one more time.

Section I
In its simplest form, the arbitrariness objection to the divine-command theory
is that by affirming the thoroughgoing dependence of right and wrong on
what God happens to command, the theory implausibly depicts them as completely arbitrary, a matter of divine caprice. 8 Perhaps some moral requirements are indeed arbitrary-for example, the requirement to worship God on
this day rather than that one. But many others-such as the duty to avoid
gratuitous cruelty-do not seem to be arbitrary at all. The point of the objection is that the divine-command theory ascribes to morality intuitively unacceptable forms of arbitrariness.
Put this way, the objection may appear to have no bearing on Adams's
version of the theory. For his version explains right and wrong in terms of
the commands of a loving God, and therefore 9 seems to save both His commands and morality from any objectionable arbitrariness.
But things are not so simple. It is at least arguable that love itself-even
divine love-is insufficient to account for all or even most of what God is
supposed to command and of what morality seems intuitively to require.lO
The difficulty is one which John Rawls, among others, has raised in connection
with the ideal-observer or impartial-sympathetic-spectator theory of morality:
... [L]ove and benevolence are second-order notions: they seek to further the
good of beloved indi viduals that is already given. If the claims of these goods
clash, benevolence is at a loss as to how to proceed, as long anyway as it
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treats these individuals as separate persons. These higher-order sentiments

do not include principles of right to adjudicate these conflicts. I I
If this is correct, then although God's love will constrain His commands to
some extent (e.g., by precluding His commanding cruelty for its own sake),
it will also leave considerable room for objectionable forms of arbitrariness.
Interestingly, and to his credit, Adams appears to recognize this point in
the course of criticizing an ideal-observer theory according to which rightness
consists in what a loving God (whether or not one exists) would command.
"I do not believe," he says, "that there is a unique set of commands that would
be issued by any loving God. There are some things that a loving God might
command and might not command."12 More specifically, "[v]ery diverse preferences about what things are to be treated as personal rights seem compatible
with love, certainly with deity."13
Equally interestingly, but less commendably, I think, Adams also appears
to accept a significant degree of arbitrariness built into the nature of morality:

... [A]mong the things that I believe actually to be valid moral demands, there
are some that I think might have been arranged differently by a God who
would stilI be loving .... For example, a loving God could have commanded
different principles regarding euthanasia from those I believe are actually in
force. 14
It is surely counterintuitive to suppose that, say, voluntary, passive euthanasia
for a terminally ill, grievously suffering patient whose relatives prefer her to
be kept alive just happens to have whatever moral status it does. And so the
arbitrariness objections poses a challenge even for Adams's modified divinecommand theory.

Section II
There are two natural ways, I suggest, in which Adams could try to meet the
arbitrariness objection (though admittedly each departs so much from his own
views that it seems unlikely that he would be very happy with it). One is to
give a more determinate account of divine love in order to explain all or most
of what God is supposed to command and of what morality intuitively requires. Robert Burch furthers this strategy when he contends that "a loving
being wills a maximum of pleasure and happiness, and a minimum of pain
and misery, for those he loves," and that therefore "God must be conceived
to will that his creatures be maximally happy and minimally miserable."15 So
conceived, evidently, God issues commands that are nonarbitrary because
designed to maximize utility (or to be such that individual or general obedience to them would do SO).16 Whether such a utilitarian elaboration of
Adams's theory does capture our intuitive moral convictions is no doubt
debatable; but in this respect the theory is at any rate no worse off than
utilitarianism itself. 17

RESPONSE TO ADAMS

75

Alternatively, Adams could argue that God has several reasons or motives
in addition to love for commanding what He does,18 and that although (unlike
love) these are not built into the nature of morality, they do suffice (together
with love) to eliminate any objectionable arbitrariness from what He actually
commands and what morality actually requires. Admittedly it is possible, on
this approach, for God to have had no such reasons, or quite different ones,
for His commands, and so it is possible too for moral requirements to have
been quite different. But Adams can claim with some plausibility that God
doesn't merely happen to issue commands for the reasons He does: it is a
fact about His stable, enduring, albeit contingent character and purposes that
He is disposed to issue those commands for those reasons. Thus although
morality could indeed have had a different content, it doesn't merely happen
to have its actual content. 19
What might God's additional reasons be? Some remarks Adams himself
makes about "the motivational force of divine commands" are relevant here.
This force depends, he says, on "what God's attributes are" and on "how God
is related to us." For example, "[i]t matters not only that God is loving but
also that he is juSt."20 And
lilt matters that God has entered into covenant with us; it matters that there
is a history between God and the individual and between God and the religious community-and that the divine commands playa significant role in
this history, and are related to divine purposes that we see being worked out
in this history and having a certain importance for our lives. 21

In a different context Adams also suggests that "[a]s the author of all things
and of all human capacities, [God] may be regarded as interested in many
forms of human excellence .... "22
No doubt this account needs to be given much more detail concerning
divine purposes and motives. But its usefulness to the second natural strategy
by which Adams might rebut the arbitrariness objection is clear enough. The
commands of a loving God who is also just, interested in human excellence,
and concerned to promote certain personal relationships with human beings
seem unlikely to render moral requirements objectionably arbitraryY
I very much suspect that Adams would prefer this second strategy to the
first, and it is, I think, the more plausible of the two. Nevertheless, both
strategies seem to me to fail, and for the same reason. To see why we need
to take a closer look at the causal/historical theory of reference Adams adopts
for moral terms.
According to this theory, the concept expressed by the term '(ethically)
wrong' tells us that "wrongness will be that property of actions (if there is
one) that best fills the role assigned to wrongness by the concept." To fill this
role a property must be "able to account for the wrongness of a major portion
of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong," and must help to
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explain causally our coming to hold these beliefs.24 Adams maintains that the
property of contrariety to the commands of a loving God meets both conditions: it is correctly "believed by Christians to belong to all and only wrong
actions," and it "plays a causal role in our classification of actions as wrong,
insofar as God has created our moral faculties to reflect his commands."2s
Precisely because of the causal/historical chain linking the commands of a
loving God to our use of '(ethically) wrong,' there is reason to regard this
property as ultimately explaining or "regulating" this use,26 and thus as constituting the referent of the term.
Suppose now-in accordance with the first strategy suggested above-that
love (alone) motivates all divine commands, and that it thereby explains or
regulates our use of moral terms. Then the causal/historical account of reference would seem to imply that contrariety to the dictates of love is the
property to which '(ethically) wrong' refers. On this approach Adams would
simply have failed to follow the causal/historical chain back far enough,21
Does the second strategy fare any better? It is not clear to me that it does.
Recall that according to this strategy as elaborated above, what motivates the
commands of our loving God is not merely love but also justice, an interest
in human excellence, and a desire for certain relationships with human beings. It is this complex of factors which would then explain or regulate our
use of moral terms, and the wrongness of an action would consist, perhaps,
in its contravening the dictates of love tempered by justice or its undermining
of human excellence or of the relationships with God. We might speak here
of the existence of several kinds of wrongness (much as Putnam speaks of
the existence of several kinds of jade28 ), while leaving it open whether to
explain this in terms of a single, disjunctive referent or in terms of referential
ambiguity. In either case the true moral theory would be, not Adams's, but a
rather messy, pluralistic one-which would substantiate the conviction of
many contemporary philosophers that morality is just too complex to be
captured by any simple, monistic theory.29
Adams, it appears, is caught in the following dilemma. On the one hand,
if he retains his twice-modified divine-command theory, then he is vulnerable
to the arbitrariness objection. On the other hand, if he adopts either of the
two strategies I have considered for meeting the objection, then he gives up
the divine-command theory altogether. 30
Section III
In the first two sections of this paper I have raised difficulties for Adams's
divine-command theory and for natural elaborations of it. Indeed, I once
believed that from these difficulties he had no acceptable means of escape.
But it now seems to me that he may be able to salvage the theory if he is
willing to modify it in a somewhat less natural way, one which might be
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regarded as a refinement of the second strategy suggested earlier for answering the arbitrariness objection. 3l
To see how the refinement works, let's put aside the divine-command
theory for a moment and turn to Putnam's causallhistorical account of the
reference of natural kind terms. In "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" Putnam
argues that the nature of the referent of a term such as 'water' consists in a
unique "hidden structure" which is shared by paradigmatic members of the
extension of the term and which explains the superficial or unhidden features
by which we ordinarily identify them.32 He also notes the possibility that there
are several such structures, as in the case of 'jade'-a term which
applies to two minerals: jadeite and nephrite. Chemically there is a marked
difference. Jadeite is a combination of sodium and aluminum. Nephrite is
made of calcium, magnesium, and iron. These two quite different microstructures produce the same unique textural qualities!33

Finally, and most relevantly for present purposes, Putnam emphasizes that it
would be a mistake "to take [his] account. .. as implying that the members of
the extension of a natural-kind word necessarily have a common hidden
structure," or even a small number of such structures. It may in fact turn
out-as it has in the case of certain disease terms-that the paradigmatic
instances "have .. .so many [hidden structures] that 'hidden structure' becomes
irrelevant, and superficial characteristics become the decisive ones."34
Taking this cue from Putnam, I suggest, Adams might modify his divinecommand theory in the following way. There is indeed some sort of
causallhistorical chain stretching back from our use of moral terms to God's
reasons or motives for commanding what He does. But God has so many such
reasons or motives that the first semantically important link in the chain is
His commands themselves. These provide a better causallhistorical explanation of our use of moral terms than do His multifarious motives, just as the
superficial features of a given natural kind may provide a better explanation
of our use of the relevant natural kind term than do the overabundant hidden
structures of the kind. 3S
Admittedly Adams might be reluctant to accept this modification of his
theory because it assigns no special role to God's love, which it treats as
merely one among many motives for His commands rather than as the only
one built into the nature of morality. Perhaps this is a price Adams would or
should be willing to pay in order to save his theory. Or perhaps the suggested
modification is compatible with giving love pride of place after all, as the
most central or pervasive of God's motives.
A more serious worry from an epistemological point of view is that the
postulation of an overabundance of divine motives seems quite ad hoc in the
present context. I do not myself find it so very implausible to suppose that
if the Judeo-Christian God exists, the motivation for His commands should
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be this complex. But I am no theologian, nor even a theist, and no doubt if
Adams were to modify his theory in the way I have suggested then it would
be incumbent upon him to supply independent evidence for such complexity.
In summary, I have argued for three main points in this paper. First, even
Adams's twice-modified divine-command theory must fact up to the arbitrariness objection. Second, his own acceptance of a causal/historical account of
the reference of moral terms prevents him from adopting either of two natural
strategies for rebutting the objection. Finally, that account does give him the
resources to meet the objection if he is willing to modify his theory one more
time by adopting a somewhat less natural strategy, and if he is able to produce
independent support for the extreme complexity of God's motives for His
commands.

Illinois Wesleyan University
NOTES
*Thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments concerning an earlier version
of this paper.
1. This characterization of the theory follows William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd edition
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 28 and John Chandler, "Divine Command
Theories and the Appeal to Love," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985), pp. 231,
236, among others.
2. In Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr., editors, Religion and Morality (Garden City,
NY: Anchor Books, 1973), esp. pp. 320-21.
3. Ibid., pp. 320-24.
4. "Moral Arguments For Theistic Belief," in C. F. Delaney, editor, Rationality and
Religious Belief (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), esp. pp. 119-23;
"Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again," Journal of Religious Ethics 7 (1979);
and "Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation," Faith and Philosophy 4
(1987).
5. "Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again," esp. Sec. IV.
6. In Sec. VI of "A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness," Adams
had struggled to reduce this implausibility.
7. See David Zimmerman, "Metaethics Naturalized," Canadian Journal of Philosophy
10 (1980); Richard W. Miller, "Ways of Moral Learning," Philosophical Review 94
(1985); Richard N. Boyd, "How to be a Moral Realist," in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, editor,
Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Stephen J. Sullivan, Moral Realism and Naturalized Metaethics (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University,
1990), Chs. 2-4.
8. Plato's Euthyphro is often interpreted as raising a parallel point about a divine-command theory of piety or holiness. Be that as it may, the objection has been endorsed by
many contemporary philosophers (typically with a nod to Plato or Socrates): see, e.g.,

RESPONSE TO ADAMS

79

Robert Young, "Theism and Morality," in Paul Helm, editor, Divine Commands and
Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 154-56, 163-64; Alasdair
MacIntyre, "Atheism and Morals," in MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, editors, The Religious
Significance of Atheism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 34-36; and
James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hili, 1986), pp.
42-44.
9. As defenders of unqualified divine-command theories have claimed in response to
the arbitrariness objection: see Edward Wierenga, "A Defensible Divine Command Theory," NoDs 17 (1983), p. 401; Robert Burch, "Objective Values and the Divine Command
Theory of Morality," New Scholasticism 54 (1980), pp. 289-91; and Patterson Brown,
"Religious Morality," Mind 73 (1963), pp. 239-40.
10. John Chandler makes essentially this point in "Divine Command Theories and the
Appeal to Love," pp. 237-38; see also William E. Mann's review of Adams's The Virtue
of Faith in The Philosophical Review 99 (1990), p. 137. In my own work the point first
occurs in an unpublished 1977 paper "On the Relationship Between Theism and Ethics,"
pp.06-07.
11. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 190-91,
quotation at 191 (emphasis added). Chandler relies heavily, as I do, on these insightful
pages in Rawls.
The significance of the italicized qualification will become clear in Sec. II (esp. note
17).
12. "Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation," p. 273; see also "Moral
Arguments for Theistic Belief," pp. 121-22.
13. "Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief," p. 122 (emphasis added).
14. "Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation," p. 273. Only if Adams
maintains that there are features besides love which are essential to morality or to God
can he avoid the imputation of arbitrariness made in the text. But unlike Edward Wierenga
(loc. cit.) he makes no move in this direction. I consider a related move in Sec. II.
15. Op. cit., pp. 293-94. I say 'furthers' rather than 'adopts' because Burch indicates
the relevance of what he regards as additional characteristics of God (e.g., fatherliness,
benevolence, and omniscience).
16. See Chandler, op. cit., p. 237.
17. Rawls contends that both act utilitarianism and the sort of ideal-observer theory
which leads to it neglect the separateness of persons: op. cit., esp. pp. 187-91.
18. Wierenga suggests that these include faithfulness, kindness, and mercifulness: loco
cit. And see note 15.
19. I borrow in these last few sentences from my paper "Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, forthcoming.
Robert Nozick appears to make a similar suggestion in Philosophical Explanations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 553.
20. "Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation," p. 272. Adams cites
MacIntyre, "Which God Ought We to Obey, and Why?," Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986),
and adds:
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'lust' is to be understood here in a sense that is quite naturalistic and largely
procedural. We are applying to God a concept that has its original home in
courts of law. Without any appeal to a standard offully moral obligation we
can recognize certain truths about justice: A just judge punishes people, if at
all, only for things that they have actually done. Merit and demerit have some
relevance to the way it is just to treat people. The just judge is interested in
getting out, and acting in accordance with, the truth (emphasis added).
One may doubt whether this notion of justice is genuinely nonmoral, and suspect that
Adams (as with his first modification) is significantly qualifying the divine-command
theory once again. But I will not pursue the matter in this paper.
21. Ibid.
22. "Saints," in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 170.
23. Patterson Brown is one divine-command theorist who explicitly appeals to God's
justice (in conjunction with His love and knowledge) in order to meet the arbitrariness
objection: loco cit.
24. "Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again," pp. 74-75. I am omitting further
details about the role.
25. Ibid., p. 76.
26. I borrow the notion of regulation here from Richard N. Boyd, op. cit., esp. p. 195.
27. It might be objected that the commands of a loving God, though motivated by His
love, are not caused by it, and that therefore the chain stops at or begins with His loving
commands. But it does not seem essential, on the causallhistorical theory of reference,
that all the links in the chain be causal. Donnellan, for one, says quite explicitly that they
needn't be: "Speaking of Nothing," in Stephen P. Schwartz, editor, Naming, Necessity and
Natural Kinds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 216, n. 3. And though Kripke
talks sometimes of causal chains (Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980), pp. 93, 96), he speaks as often of histories (p. 95), historical
connections or chains (pp. 157, 163), or "causal or historical connection[s]" (p. 96, n. 43),
and calls his account of proper names "the historical acquisition picture" (p. 164).
28. "The Meaning of 'Meaning,'" in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical
Papers, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 241. This example
is described further in Sec. III.
29. See, e.g., W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1930) and Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986).
Like all pluralist theories, this one would face the problem of how to resolve conflicts
among the basic principles of right and wrong. But it may possess resources in this regard
which other such theories lack. For presumably the relative importance of various rightand wrong-making factors will be reflected to some degree in God's commands, and so
determinate resolutions of at least some basic moral conflicts will exist (however difficult
they may be for us to ascertain).
To be sure, there is another possibility (to which an anonymous referee has called my
attention): that only a decision from God could resolve conflicts among the basic moral
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considerations. This would certainly allow divine commands to play an important (albeit
limited) role in morality. It would also raise the issue of arbitrariness all over again.
Whether the view suggested would make morality objectionably arbitrary is a question I
will not try to answer here.
30. I assume here that on any divine-command theory worthy of the name, agreement
or disagreement with God's will or commands is at least in part what makes actions right
or wrong.
It is worth noting that the foregoing dilemma is itself closely related to a version of the
arbitrariness objection which is more sophisticated than the simple one presented in Sec.
I. As I indicated in "Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality," this version may be
explained as follows:
On the one hand, if God has no reasons for what He commands, then His
commands-and hence morality as well, according to the [divine-command]
theory-are fundamentally arbitrary. On the other hand, if God does have
reasons for what He commands, then it is those reasons rather than divine
commands on which morality ultimately depends. The first horn of the dilemma is said to be too implausible to be acceptable; the second, to abandon
the divine-command theory itself.
In the same paper I argued that this objection, as it stands, rests on a kind of category
mistake: in particular, on the false assumption that there must be a logical conflict between
a "constitutive" explanation of rightness and wrongness in terms of divine commands and
a "nonconstitutive," partly motivational explanation of rightness and wrongness in terms
of the reasons for those commands. But I suggested in the end, without elaboration, that
the objection "succeeds against a combination of the divine-command theory and a causal
account of the reference of moral terms." The results of the present section so far bear out
that suggestion. In Sec. III, however, I shall argue that these results do not quite hold up.
31. Another way out may be to argue that the causallhistorical chain stops at God's will
because His will (like God Himself) literally is His love, His justice, etc. In "Absolute
Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann
defend the doctrine of divine simplicity presupposed here and suggest that it can be used
to defuse the arbitrariness objection: "because it is God's whole nature, not just his
arbitrary decision, which is said to constitute the standard for morality, only things
consonant with God's nature could be morally good" (p. 376, emphasis added). I suspect
that this doctrine-whose very coherence remains highly controversial-involves more
metaphysical baggage than Adams would (or should) wish to carry. In any case, it seems
to me that the account of morality Stump and Kretzmann give is more of a divine-nature
than a divine-command theory; I hope to pursue this topic in a later paper.
32. Op. cit., pp. 223ff. Adams himself briefly explains Putnam's treatment of this
example in "Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again," pp. 72-73.
33. Op. cit., p. 241.
34. Ibid., pp. 240-41 (emphasis added to 'so many'). 1. D. Trout tells me that 'schizophrenia' may be such a term.
35. It is an interesting question why these shallower explanations are better. Part of the
answer, I think, is that they are considerably more unifying; but I shall not pursue the
question here.

